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Abstract 
The article introduces a framework for analyzing the knowledge that researchers draw upon when 
designing a research project by distinguishing four types of “project knowledge”: goal knowledge, 
which concerns possible outcomes, and three forms of implementation knowledge that concern the 
realization of the project: 1) methodological knowledge that specifies possible experimental and non-
experimental strategies to achieve the chosen goal; 2) representational knowledge that suggests 
ways to represent data, hypotheses, or outcomes; and 3) organizational knowledge that helps to 
build or navigate the material and social structures that enable a project. In the design of research 
projects such knowledge will be transferred from other successful projects and these processes will 
be analyzed in terms of modes of resituating knowledge. The account is developed by analyzing a 
case from the history of biology. In a reciprocal manner, it enables a better understanding of the 
historical episode in question: around 1970, several researchers who had made successful careers in 
the emerging field of molecular biology, working with bacterial model systems, attempted to create a 
molecular biology of the physiological processes in multicellular organisms. One of them was 
Seymour Benzer, who designed a research project addressing the physiological processes underlying 
behavior in Drosophila. 
Keywords: Project knowledge; Resituating Knowledge; Method; Seymour Benzer; Drosophila; 
Behavior 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1968, Seymour Benzer (1921-2007) provided the first proposition of a new research program on 
which he had embarked formally only one year earlier: the “search for defects in non-phototactic 
mutants describes the outline of a research program to attack the mechanisms underlying behavior 
by genetic methods” (Benzer, 1968, p. 52). A research program, or rather an actual project informed 
by a program, is a complex arrangement. As the quotation makes clear, it addresses a domain of 
phenomena under investigation (behavior), and typically a subset of the phenomena that can be 
studied in an exemplary manner (phototaxis), and it is based on an idea about the appropriate form 
of result (mechanistic explanation) and a suitable methodology (genetic methods). The goals (here, 
the mechanistic explanation) will be divided in several subtasks and the methods to achieve these 
tasks will involve several techniques specific to the material at hand that involve suitable instruments 
(e.g., behavioral screening devices), reagents (e.g., mutagens), and, in biology, typically an 
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experimental organism (in this case, the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster). Furthermore, employing 
the techniques, making the organisms available, and coordinating the work in a collective requires 
the project to be embedded in physical infrastructures, institutions, and social relations (in this case, 
a lab at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), the social hierarchy of a principle investigator 
and the postdocs and graduate students working in the lab, and the Drosophila community and its 
systems of communication and exchange of protocols, mutant stocks, and other resources). In part 1 
of this article, I will develop a framework for analyzing the kind of knowledge researchers draw on 
when designing and embedding a research project. The proposed account facilitates the 
identification of the sources of such “project knowledge” and the analysis of the processes of its 
resituation. The framework is developed from the case of Benzer’s work in behavioral genetics 
presented in part 2, and in turn helps to understand how new research programs emerged around 
1970 in biology and engendered conceptual change. The study thus also contributes to the history of 
this period, which was characterized not only by a molecularization of physiological processes, but 
also by the encounter of molecular biology with higher organisms, as well as new models of gene 
action (Morange, 1997; Burian and Thieffry, 2000; Suárez-Díaz and García-Deister, 2015). It 
furthermore contributes to the history of behavioral biology broadly construed. 
2. The resituation of project knowledge in the design of research projects 
2.1. Project knowledge in the design of research projects 
“Research program” and “research project” are both actors’ terms.1 Sometimes “research program” 
and “research project” can be used interchangeably, but they are not synonymous. “Research 
program” refers to the generalized plan underlying a project that can in principle be taken up by 
other researchers at other times to inform their respective projects. Both Sydney Brenner (b. 1927) 
and George Streisinger (1927-1984), for instance, refer to Benzer’s research program in the 
exposition of their respective projects (Brenner, 1974; Streisinger et al., 1981). A research project, 
instead, is intended and carried out by a particular person or group at a given time. It makes sense to 
speak of several sub-projects, tackling individual problems or delivering partial results under the 
umbrella of a larger project informed by a research program. The term “project” still emphasizes the 
plan and its execution (one may have a project before embarking on it, but one can also actively 
pursue a project); the expression “research process” is probably most appropriate to refer to the 
actual embodied and materialized actions and events, including reasoning and symbolic activities 
that occur when a project is carried out. Much of scientific activity takes the form of research 
projects pursued in a lab or field site by smaller (often hierarchically organized) teams of researchers 
associated with one or more institutions. Projects can often be identified insofar as they are 
acknowledged as such in grant proposals, reports, notebooks, correspondence, publications of 
results or personal recollections; they typically consist of a series of experiments or other forms of 
inquiry and result in a single article or, more often, a series of research articles.2 Projects address a 
domain of phenomena, such as ontogenetic development or the behavior of organisms, by asking 
                                                          
1 The meaning of “research program” is narrower than in Imre Lakatos’ (1978) use of the term in the sense that 
it addresses what underlies particular projects rather than larger disciplinary formations. It is also more 
centered on methodological approaches rather than theories. Rheinberger (2000) uses “project” in the sense 
intended here in an analysis that inspired the present account. 
2 This seems to be true at least for the natural sciences in the twentieth century, but even here there are other 
forms of research. One may ask if the framework provided here also applies to “big science” projects, e.g., the 
Human Genome Project. Furthermore, collection-based work, for instance in systematics, might exhibit quite 
different forms of organization and temporality. 
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specific questions that can be addressed with an appropriate methodology. The same domain might 
also be addressed by other researchers asking different questions and applying different methods, 
i.e., it might be the subject of other research projects.3 Projects are episodes of research that inquire 
into open questions pertaining to epistemic things, i.e., previously identified entities or processes 
within a domain that “embody what one does not yet know” (Rheinberger 1997, p. 28). Epistemic 
things emerge in a domain often from the perspective of one set of questions or methods, but can – 
once identified – become the subject of other approaches and can also become seen as relevant 
entities in a different domain. 
Questions, concepts and methods, instruments and reagents, institutions and communities – all of 
these heterogeneous elements are assembled in a research project. They are brought into new 
constellations and are often transformed in this process. This implies that most if not all of them 
have a history: elements that enter a research project are transferred from one context to another; 
novelty arises from recombination. Paul Rabinow writes: “However, from time to time, new forms 
emerge that have something significant about them, something that catalyzes previously present 
actors, things, institutions into a new mode of existence, a new assemblage, an assemblage that 
made things work in a different manner” (Rabinow, 2000, p. 44). “Assemblage” refers to the result, 
emphasizing the novelty that is enabled by an assemblage, which cannot be reduced to the effect of 
the individual elements. Nonetheless, many authors are interested in the emergence of the socio-
techno-natural assemblages formed in a research project. Detailed accounts of research episodes in 
the history of science show how various elements are brought together in research projects and they 
often trace the origins or genealogies of these elements. However, studies focusing on material 
practices typically do not explicitly distinguish the transfer of research materials and technologies 
from the transfer of knowledge about how to plan experiments, prepare materials, construct 
devices, etc. Similarly, authors who emphasize social practices do not always distinguish the building 
of new or the use of existing infrastructures, or the mobilization of a social formation from 
transferring knowledge about how to set up, transform, or utilize such contexts and conditions. 
Studies on knowledge transfer, finally, often look at the way scientific concepts or data travel 
between contexts, but rarely address scientists’ knowledge about how to develop research questions 
and appropriate methods, or how to adjust a research project in the face of unexpected findings. In 
this study, I aim to show that researchers either already possess or actively seek knowledge that 
enables them to design a research project or to amend it in the face of emerging constraints and 
opportunities. I will refer to such knowledge as “project knowledge.”4 What is the nature of such 
knowledge? Are there different types of project knowledge? How do researchers acquire it and how 
do they transfer it from one research context to another? These are the questions that will be 
                                                          
3 I use the term “domain” with reference to Dudley Shapere (1984), Ch. 13. Shapere was interested more in the 
concept of a scientific theory than in goals and methods informing practices. What he points out, however, is 
that certain phenomena are the subject matter of research, but at the same time cannot be identified 
independently of (changing) scientific perspectives, i.e., domains are not given. For two research groups to 
address “the same domain” with different questions and by different means, thus always implies a shared 
interpretation on some broader level. 
4 The advantage of “project knowledge” is that it facilitates the comparison of projects aimed at generating 
knowledge with projects of, say, producing an artwork or developing technologies or services. One of the 
realms where the term is used (albeit often in a less specified manner) is knowledge management in 
organisations (see, e.g., Schindler and Eppler, 2003). 
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addressed through the further explication of the notion of “project knowledge” and the analysis of a 
case from the history of biology. 
2.2. Project knowledge and other project relevant knowledge 
Projects materialize in a series of activities performed by the researchers, i.e., the actual research 
process. Project knowledge can thus at first instance be characterized as knowledge that informs the 
activities necessary to carry out a project. A useful distinction is that between knowledge about the 
possible goals of a project and knowledge about how to accomplish that goal, i.e., how to implement 
the project. This distinction can be drawn for many kinds of projects. In research projects “goal 
knowledge” concerns the kinds of knowledge that can be achieved. What might be more generally 
referred to as “implementation knowledge,” instead, concerns the methods applied, but also other 
activities related to a project (see 1.3, below). Unlike “procedural knowledge,” it is not restricted to 
experimental activities but includes a broader range of activities that are necessary to implement a 
project. Furthermore, procedural knowledge is usually contrasted with declarative knowledge, 
whereas implementation knowledge can often take the form of explicit instructions (Gooding, 1990, 
pp. 8-9). Indeed, carrying out a research project often requires embodied skills in handling certain 
instruments or materials. Such skills are acquired through practice and in principle skills pertaining to 
a given material or instrument can become helpful when handling novel objects and are in that sense 
transferred. Nonetheless, implementation knowledge, as it is understood here, although it might be 
tacit in many cases, is acquired not from practicing experimental gestures, but from understanding 
the steps necessary to achieve a goal and can in principle be made explicit. Hence it is transferred in 
different ways from procedural knowledge (see 1.5). 
While project knowledge is not knowledge-how, it is knowledge about possible goals and how to 
achieve them. As such, it can be very generic, specifying what can be known about any or at least 
many domains of phenomena as well as generic strategies for obtaining knowledge of different 
kinds. More often, however, project knowledge will be more specific for a given domain and even if 
generic project knowledge constitutes the starting point it needs to be adjusted to the case at hand 
(see 1.4). Where project knowledge contains domain-specific knowledge, it needs to be distinguished 
from other knowledge specific for the phenomena that enters a research project. Certainly, 
researchers start from reviewing what is already known about the phenomena or specific epistemic 
things in a domain of interest. Furthermore, specific data, say about the chromosomal position of a 
gene, might be necessary to plan an intervention. But goal knowledge is knowledge about how to 
generate research questions from what is already known (i.e., to specify what is not known). If, for 
instance, the elements participating in a physiological process have been identified, knowledge about 
mechanistic explanations might prompt a researcher to ask how they interact. Similarly, 
implementation knowledge pertaining to the methodological approach draws on very specific 
knowledge about the research material as well as the instruments or other elements, but it is not 
identical with this knowledge. It is knowledge about how to employ such information to generate 
approaches that yield the kind of knowledge specified as the goal of a project. 
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2.3. Types of project knowledge and their function 
Project knowledge can be addressed in terms of “schemata,” a term that is borrowed from cognitive 
science and is meant to point out that the knowledge in question is richly structured.5 Goal 
knowledge has already been distinguished from implementation knowledge. Goal schemata codify 
knowledge about problems and results; such schemata characterize possible forms of empirical 
knowledge that can be the outcome of a project. The schemata define relations between abstract (or 
concrete, i.e., domain-specific) placeholders that can potentially be instantiated (or, respectively, 
replaced) by objects or events in a (different) domain. Such schemata can represent outcomes of 
projects in various degrees of complexity (e.g., similarity elations or taxonomies, localizations or 
topologies, causal correlations or mechanisms, etc.). They concern the form of empirical knowledge 
rather than its specific content and enable researchers to formulate a question with respect to a 
domain of interest.6 
Regarding implementation knowledge, from the function of project knowledge to inform research 
activity it follows that a typology can be achieved by reflecting on the kinds of activities that make up 
the research process. Research activities can, of course, be parsed and classified in many ways. The 
following suggested classifications reflect different aspects of research that have been highlighted in 
recent, practice-oriented history and philosophy of science: 
a) Activities involving the specific research materials and technology. These are, for instance, the 
activities of experimentation that are performed in the context of experimental systems 
(Rheinberger 1997).7 While for the purpose of this article it is sufficient to speak of experimental 
systems as the spaces where this kind of activity happens, the spaces of action created through 
decisions and technologies in the context of field studies, for instance, can be addressed as 
observational systems, and the relevant activities can also be performed in the context of 
computational or other kinds of model systems (Keller, 2003; Burkhardt, 2005). 
b) Activities of crafting representations. These activities are closely intertwined with the activities in 
a). They aim at recording and displaying data, or representing more complex research for 
reasoning (e.g., drawing diagrams of hypothetical mechanisms), distribution (e.g., preparing data 
for databases), or communication (e.g., narrating an explanation for a journal article). 
                                                          
5 Marvin Minsky, who uses the term “frame,” wrote: “When one encounters a new situation (or makes a 
substantial change in one's view of the present problem) one selects from memory a structure called a frame. 
This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. A frame is a data-
structure for representing a stereotyped situation […]. We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and 
relations. The ‘top levels’ of a frame are fixed, and represent things that are always true about the supposed 
situation. The lower levels have many terminals–‘slots’ that must be filled by specific instances or data. Each 
terminal can specify conditions its assignments must meet. (The assignments themselves are usually smaller 
‘sub-frames.’)” (Minsky, 1988, p. 156) 
6 Some philosophers speak of schemata in a similar way, but are restricted to forms of explanation (e.g., 
Thagard, 2003; Craver and Darden, 2013). 
7 See, e.g., Radder (2009) for a review of the literature on the history and philosophy of experimentation. 
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Representations can be constructed in various media, symbol systems, and formats (Vorms, 
2013; Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2015).8 
c) Activities of establishing, maintaining, and using material infrastructures and social institutions 
that enable the experimental (or observational, or modelling) work, i.e., provide the context in 
which the activities addressed in a) and b) can happen. These are the activities aimed at 
organizing or navigating communities and institutions (including gaining funding for research), 
setting up and handling material repositories or databases, interacting with instrument makers 
or service facilities, etc. These activities naturally often happen on the community level and they 
are pursued independently and beyond the time and locality of individual experiments, in order 
to enable many projects by many researchers.9 
It is now possible to identify three types of implementation knowledge that scientists draw upon to 
develop a research project, which inform the three kinds of activities, respectively.  
1) Knowledge about how to solve a problem or achieve a result (methodological schemata): Such 
schemata characterize possible (technologically mediated) strategies to make entities appear as 
instances of a specific goal schema a methodological schema is associated with (e.g., collect and 
compare for achieving a taxonomy, intervening on one element in a system and observe changes 
in another for finding causal correlations, etc.). To execute the methodological strategy will 
require further specific domain knowledge (e.g., how to manipulate the objects in question) and 
possibly also skills in handling the materials.10 
2) Knowledge about how to represent knowledge of a given form (notational schemata): Such 
schemata characterize the media, symbol systems, and formats of notations that can be used to 
express knowledge as specified by the goal schema that selected an associated notational 
schema (e.g., tables for taxonomies, maps for spatial composition, arrow diagrams or certain 
types of narratives for causal/mechanistic explanations, etc.). To produce the representations 
will require additional knowledge about the media in question or skills in working with the tools 
involved.11 
3) Knowledge about how to organize research work (organizational schemata): Such schemata 
characterize possible strategies for establishing, choosing, maintaining, or navigating material 
infrastructure, social rules, and institutions (e.g., museum collections, laboratories, field stations, 
                                                          
8 Hentschel (2014) reviews much of the literature on visual culture in science, but narrative and other textual 
genres are also relevant here (see Morgan and Wise, 2017). 
9 Rachel Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli  show how social and material structures enabling research might emerge 
from individual research projects, but transcend them and provide continuity even under substantial shifts in 
theory and experimental practice (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2016). They also emphasize the role of these factors in 
collaboration and integration across research projects. While I agree with their points, my perspective here is 
inverse: I am interested in how researchers use these structures, or take them as models for building new ones. 
10 The notion of strategy implies knowledge that informs activities. Philosophers and historians have looked at 
many strategies to acquire knowledge in particular cases, or for specific forms of knowledge. See, e.g., Müller-
Wille (2007) for taxonomies, Woodward (2003) for causal correlations, or Bechtel and Richardson (2010) for 
mechanistic explanations. 
11 Hentschel (2014), Ch. 5, also addresses cases of transfer of visual techniques, which implies that knowledge 
about visual techniques can be identified. 
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etc., and the technological and social arrangements that they require) which are necessary to 
create the conditions for realizing the strategy specified by the methodological schemata that 
selected an appropriate organizational schema. Entrenching their research in socio-material 
structures based on such knowledge is not only important for scientists to make their work 
physically possible, but also to gain acceptance and support.12 
The following section will further elaborate on the nature of project knowledge before the question 
of resituating such knowledge is addressed (1.5). 
2.4. Project knowledge bundles, domain specificity, and the dynamic character of research 
projects 
In the sense that these kinds of schemata are closely associated, knowledge of types of goals, 
methods, representations, and organizational structures often comes in bundles. Such bundles can, 
however, be unpacked and elements can be recombined or new elements can be introduced. Very 
generic schemata bundles like those mentioned above enable researchers to approach new domains 
of phenomena because, not knowing anything about them, they still know what could be known 
about them (e.g., what entities there are, how they are composed and distributed, how they interact, 
etc.), how to go about investigating them (make collections, intervene on parameters, etc.), and how 
to organize the work (building research sites or repositories, founding institutions, etc.). It also allows 
researchers to switch fields and make their previous experiences fruitful. More often, however, the 
project knowledge researchers rely on will consist of schemata specific for the domain for which they 
were trained to pose and solve research problems, i.e., schemata will be encoded with the respective 
placeholders in the structures filled with representations of actual, concrete realizations (e.g., 
knowledge of how to classify based on morphological characters, or how to intervene on the genetic 
level etc.). Furthermore, actual goals of research projects will consist of complex combinations of 
goal schemata (the schema of a mechanistic explanation, for instance, is composed of sub-schemata 
of composition, localization, causal interactions, etc.) and hence entail more complex 
methodological, representational, and organizational schemata. Researchers are not necessarily 
aware of the generic structures or principles behind their goals and strategies, but if there is no 
applicable specific schema available to them they typically reason on the basis of a more generic 
schema derived by abstraction from a domain-specific schema. Finding new research questions, 
developing new methods to approach problems, or devising new technologies – hence creativity in 
science – can be understood as based on abstraction, analogies and recombination on the level of 
such schemata.  
Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981), who is also attentive to the role of analogy in the process, points to the 
activities of assembling a project by invoking the notion of tinkering. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997) 
emphasizes the role of unprecedented events in experimentation over the intentions of the 
researchers and Friedrich Steinle (1997) described the often exploratory character of research. In this 
way, however, these authors highlight the opportunistic over the planned character of research. 
Emphasizing the knowledge that researchers mobilize to define their goals and inform the activities 
necessary to achieve them seems, instead, to depict research as a planned and hence predetermined 
endeavor. The proposed account of project knowledge is consistent with the above observations, 
however, in that: a) goal schemata often only assume that entities have properties, are composed of 
                                                          
12 Scholars in science and technology studies have been particularly attentive to the strategies scientists follow 
in this respect (e.g., Latour, 1987). 
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parts, are involved in productive interactions, etc., which is not in contradiction with exploratory 
experimentation or the unexpected appearance of entities, properties, parts, or interactions; b) 
unprecedented events can only become perceived in the context of planned, systematic activity; and 
c) in response to such events goals are often abandoned, but new goals (and appropriate methods, 
etc.) are chosen and pursued, again, in a planned manner. Project knowledge does not inform a rigid 
plan. Instead, when the project develops, new project knowledge is often activated or sought to 
amend the project in a dynamic way. This dynamic character of creativity can be even better 
appreciated by attending to the project knowledge that drives the often-observed changes in 
strategy. 
2.5. The resituation of project knowledge 
How is project knowledge transferred? Mary Morgan (2014) offers an account of knowledge transfer 
by articulating the notion of resituating knowledge. The account provides an alternative to a simple 
model of knowledge diffusion. The problem arises because knowledge is always produced in specific 
local settings and therefore does not generalize or apply to other cases in an obvious manner. 
Whereas probably most instances of knowledge transfer, in contrast to mere diffusion of knowledge, 
involve decoupling knowledge from the context of its origin and adjusting it to the target context, the 
notion of resituation can be understood to emphasize the effectiveness of transferred knowledge in 
shaping the target context and is thus stronger than the notion of transfer. Project knowledge 
certainly creates the new research situation in the first place, when it is transferred to a new context. 
Morgan suggests three strategies that scientists use to resituate knowledge. Making knowledge 
produced in one locality relevant for use in another situation may be achieved by: a) “establishing 
comparable sites where the local specific knowledge may apply directly”; b) “extracting—
desituating—some causal or conceptual knowledge from local findings that can then be resituated in 
comparable sites elsewhere”; or c) “establishing local knowledge as ‘typical’ and thence available to 
be used in many other comparable (or contrasting) sites” (Morgan, 2014, p. 1014). Morgan is 
interested in knowledge in terms of results of research – that is, knowledge that has been generated 
about certain entities or processes in a local setting. Project knowledge, which is knowledge about 
how to generate knowledge, is distinct from such knowledge, even if it can be more or less domain-
specific (see 1.2, above). Nonetheless, it is plausible to expect similar strategies to be employed by 
scientists when attempting to make goals, methods, notations, or organizational principles 
developed in one situation available in other situations. 
The present account is concerned with knowledge about how to conceive of, set up, and run a 
research project: How are questions or problems that have been posed in one situation transferred 
to other situations to generate new goals? How are methods of observation, experimentation or 
modelling, or techniques of representation of data and results that have been developed to produce 
certain results or solve certain problems in one domain applied to another domain or other objects in 
a given domain? How can strategies to organize work developed in one context be applied in 
another? Next to Morgan’s account, other models of knowledge transfer and circulation have been 
suggested in the literature. Sabina Leonelli’s notion of data journeys, for instance, apart from being 
concerned with results of research episodes or high-through-put data acquisition process, is different 
from the account of resituation because it focuses on the packaging of data for re-use (Leonelli 2016, 
Ch. 1.2). In the case of project knowledge, those at the source, i.e., researchers who have 
successfully developed goals and implementation strategies to some degree, package their project 
knowledge for re-use in research articles (in the “methods and materials,” but also often in the 
“results” or equivalent sections). However, this mainly applies to direct replicability of specific 
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procedures.13 When researchers embarking on a new project resituate project knowledge, more 
often they need to seek it at its source and de-situate it themselves by performing some form of 
abstraction. Hence, unlike in the case of curated databases, the necessary steps for resituation are 
provided neither by the researchers at the source nor by some mediators. Other accounts of 
knowledge circulation emphasize standardization and ready-made solutions. Joan Fujimura speaks of 
“standardized packages,” which consist of a “scientific theory and a standardized set of technologies” 
(Fujimura, 1992, p. 169), while Peter Keating and Alberto Cambrosio speak of “biomedical platforms” 
as “combinations of techniques, instruments, reagents, skills, constituent entities (morphologies, 
cell-surface markers, genes), spaces of representations, diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic 
indications, and related etiologic accounts” (Keating and Cambrosio, 2003, p. 4). Focusing on 
packages, these accounts do not discriminate between circulating material (research kits, 
instruments) and circulating knowledge, nor between project knowledge and other relevant 
knowledge. Furthermore, they emphasize the stabilization of standards and routines in similar 
contexts, whereas the present account is interested more in processes of creativity and 
recombination where researchers draw from heterogenous sources, leading to a diversification of 
research programs.14 
The case study displays several modes of resituating project knowledge, which can be located in 
Morgan’s typology and will be summarized in the conclusion. Before attending to the case (part 2, 
below), the choice of Benzer’s research in behavioral genetics will be justified both in terms of its 
suitability for the philosophical purpose and its relevance for the history of molecular biology and 
behavioral biology. Furthermore, the advantages of the project knowledge framework for both 
philosophy and history of science will be pointed out. 
2.6. The case study and the value of the framework for philosophy of science and for history of 
science 
It is possible that many cases of knowledge transfer, which at first sight appear as a resituation of 
research findings, in fact turn out to be more accurately described as a resituation of research 
approaches and hence of project knowledge. When results from research on model organisms is 
transferred to other organisms or possibly human cell cultures, the task is often not to extrapolate 
knowledge in an act of reasoning, but to recreate a similar experimental access to the entities or 
processes in question in the target experimental system (see also Bechtel, 2009). For this reason, an 
account of project knowledge can facilitate the study of modes of resituating knowledge. 
Furthermore, the notion of project knowledge taken together with modes of its resituation provides 
an important complement to studies on creativity, innovation, and discovery in science. Previous 
accounts have typically either emphasized aspects of conceptual reasoning, for instance in terms of 
analogy, or material practice, showing, for instance, how novel entities emerge in novel experimental 
systems (see, e.g., Meheus and Nickles, 2009). An account of project knowledge expands this work 
and provides a link between such studies by pointing to the reasoning that informs novel practices, 
which in turn can give rise to novel concepts. Given that project knowledge is often imported into a 
                                                          
13 More generic accounts of methods might be provided in textbooks. 
14 The notion of bundles introduced in sect. 1.4, unlike “packages” in Fujimura’s sense, is meant to point less to 
standardization and more to the learned association of types of goals and suitable strategies for achieving 
them (both generic and domain-specific). 
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project from different disciplines, in some cases by different project participants, the account should 
also enrich the study of interdisciplinarity (MacLeod, 2016). 
Historical case studies are essential for a philosophical understanding of the formation of novel 
approaches in science because the latter process is historical in nature, i.e., extended in time and 
situated in specific geographical and social constellations. Furthermore, these processes can only be 
understood from the perspective of their consequences in terms of broader changes in the scientific 
landscape. A case study should thus not simply be seen as an example from history, but as displaying 
the historicity of the process. This implies, on the one hand, that an account of the formation of new 
research programs is important for a philosophical understanding of scientific change that is based 
on practices rather than theories and acknowledges complex patterns of merging and diverging 
approaches. On the other hand, it makes clear why such an account is useful for writing the history of 
specific changes in a discipline such as biology. In part 2 of the article, I will analyze the resituation of 
project knowledge in the formation of Benzer’s research program in behavioral genetics.15 The case is 
particularly suitable for investigating these processes.16 Typically researchers gradually transform 
their research activities, reacting to opportunities that arise from their experimental systems or to 
technical or conceptual developments in their broader field or in other areas of science. Benzer, 
instead, explicitly abandoned his successful research program in phage genetics and set out to make 
contributions in another field, or rather in a niche at the intersection of various fields that he 
considered unoccupied. For this reason, he established a new research program in a relatively short 
time. In this concentrated form, the process of resituating project knowledge becomes easily visible. 
Frederic Holmes acknowledges that Benzer seems unique in switching fields two times in his career, 
first from solid-state physics to phage genetics, and later from the latter field to behavior genetics, 
working with a metazoan model organism. Holmes points out that “[…] even when making such leaps 
from field to field, Benzer found transition pathways that enabled him to cross from one main line to 
another without losing all the investments that he had made in his previous research activity” 
(Holmes, 2004, p. 22). This implies that Benzer resituated knowledge from one field in another. Given 
that the domains of phenomena are quite distinct (although less so in the second case), the relevant 
kind of knowledge must in part be relative generic project knowledge rather than accumulated 
knowledge about the domain.  
The case of Benzer’s research program in behavioral genetics not only serves as a suitable case for 
the study of project knowledge and its modes of resituation, but is furthermore relevant for the 
understanding of the period that has been referred to as the ‘‘long 1970s’’ (1969–1983) by Edna 
Suárez-Díaz and Vivette García-Deister. These authors characterize it as “an important though often 
overlooked period in the development of a rich landscape in the research of metabolism, 
development, and evolution” (2015, p. 503). Whereas these authors focus on the emergence of 
models of gene regulation (e.g., those of Eric H. Davison, 1937-2015), they acknowledge the presence 
                                                          
15 Obviously, the reasoning processes involving project knowledge cannot be observed directly, but can only be 
inferred from the available sources. It has been pointed out that the rationale of a project is often constructed 
in retrospect when writing up the research publication (e.g., Gooding, 1990; Holmes et al., 2003). And yet, 
starting from Benzer’s programmatic statements published in a very early phase and comparing them to later 
research articles makes it possible to get an idea of the planning of the project and its subsequent dynamic 
development. 
16 The questions of resituating approaches and results applies to research in philosophy of science as much as 
in science. Under what conditions a philosophical analysis developed based on a case study can be generalized 
or applied to different cases is subject to methodological debate (see, e.g., Scholl and Räz, 2016). 
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at the time of more reductionist approaches put forward by members of the first generation of 
molecular biologists. These researchers had worked with bacteria and were driven by the 
“expectation that molecular genetics could be extrapolated from bacteria to eukaryotic cells” (p. 
507). Among them were next to Benzer also François Jacob (1920-2013), as well as Brenner and 
Streisinger. While of these Brenner’s work with c. elegans was the most successful and became the 
subject of some philosophical and historical literature (Ankeny, 2000; de Chadarevian, 1998; 
Schaffner, 1998), Benzer’s work with Drosophila has not received much attention.17 The latter had, 
however, a different focus from the work of Brenner, who aimed for a complete description of neural 
development. Benzer’s work was highly influential in its own way and opened many new research 
avenues and the reconstruction of his approach thus adds to the historical analysis of this line of 
work.18 Given Benzer’s emphasis on behavior, rather than neuro-physiology, at least in the beginning, 
and later research on behavior taking up his approach, the given study also expands the literature on 
the history of behavioral biology that has so far mainly concentrated on behaviorism and ethology 
(see, e.g., Burkhardt, 2005). 
Michel Morange (1997) associates the work of Jacob, Brenner, and Benzer with a crisis in molecular 
biology. Complementary to the notion of a molecularization of the physiology of development and 
other processes in multicellular organisms, Morange emphasizes the “deep transformations which 
occurred in molecular biology and which led from a molecular biology of the gene to a molecular 
biology of the cell” (p. 370). The experience of crisis that Morange identifies at the beginning of this 
process was not only induced by the notion that, on the level of the gene, nothing was left to 
discover, but also by the lack of technologies that would enable molecular biologists to tackle 
metazoan physiology on a molecular level. In addition, Morange argues, “what happened during 
these years was the progressive definition by molecular biologists of what had to be explained and 
what would constitute an explanation” (p. 372). It is exactly when grappling with such questions that 
the resituation of project knowledge becomes relevant. Hence the philosophical account developed 
based on the historical episode in turn allows a better understanding of what drove this particular 
historical development. In this sense, this article constitutes a study in integrated HPS, or, since the 
latter term has been used in many ways in recent years (see, e.g., Scholl and Räz, 2016), what I would 
call “reciprocal HPS.” 
3. Designing a research project: Seymour Benzer’s behavioral genetics 
3.1. The researcher: Benzer’s investigative pathway from bacteriophage to a metazoan model 
system 
A central aspect of a research project is, of course, the individual researcher, or, more often, the 
group of researchers, who are part of communities and institutions, carry out the relevant activities, 
and communicate results to their peers. Most importantly, researchers possess or actively acquire 
                                                          
17 Weiner (1999) provides a journalistic account of Benzer’s work in this period; for Streisinger’s work with 
Zebrafish, see Meunier (2012); for Jacob’s work with mice, see Morange (2000a). 
18 As many obituaries and reviews indicate, Benzer is generally seen as a “founding father” or “pioneer” in 
behavioral genetics (“the single gene approach”) and neuro-genetics (see, e.g., Sokolowski, 2001; Vosshall, 
2007; Greenspan, 2009). Also the genealogy of more specific fields can be traced back to individual mutants 
that were first described in his lab, such as the circadian rhythm mutant period, which helped to initiate a field 
that has recently been in the spotlight due to the awarding of the 2017 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
(Abrahamsen and Bechtel, 2015; http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2017, accessed 
21 Dec 2017). 
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the knowledge relevant to design their research project. Which knowledge they possess or which 
resources they are likely to draw from to acquire new knowledge strongly depends on their previous 
experience. Before attending to the project knowledge underlying Benzer’s research project, I shall 
therefore briefly contextualize his work regarding his biography, or rather his investigative pathway 
(Holmes, 2004). When Benzer turned to Drosophila to address the phenomena of behavior by 
genetic means, he was already a celebrated scientist. He had mapped the fine structure of a gene in 
bacteriophage (Benzer, 1955), an achievement not only pivotal to the development of molecular 
genetics, but also often cited as constituting an important conceptual and methodological bridge 
between classical and molecular genetics.19 Like many other protagonists of early molecular biology, 
Benzer started his career in physics and, like others, he cited Erwin Schrödinger’s (1887-1961) What 
is life? (Schrödinger, 1944) as an important influence for changing fields in his autobiographical 
narrative (Benzer, 1991, p. 15). While working as an assistant professor in physics at Purdue 
University (where he had obtained his PhD in 1947) doing research on the semiconductor properties 
of Germanium, Benzer took the summer course in phage genetics at the Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory in 1948. Subsequently, he spent much time on leave from Purdue to work at various 
institutions, among them Caltech in Pasadena, CA, USA, the Medical Research Council (MRC) Unit for 
the Study of the Molecular Structure of Biological Systems at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, 
UK, as well as the Institute Pasteur in Paris, France, to familiarize himself with microbiology and 
biochemistry techniques. Gradually, he became one of the central figures in the “Phage Group” 
around Max Delbrück (1906-1981).20 Benzer pursued several questions reaching from phage 
replication and host range to phenotypic expression (plaque morphology) in the context of the 
broader hypothesis that phage could be characterized best in terms of genetic material, which had 
informed the work of the group from the beginning. The plan to map the fine structure of the rII 
region of E. coli phage T4 (a locus associated with the rapid destruction of the host cell) grew 
gradually in spring 1954. Benzer developed a method based on collecting as many mutations in the 
respective region as possible (an approach that required large numbers and fast phenotypic screens 
that could not be achieved in metazoan systems), on calculations based on recombination events, 
and on employing a variation of the cis-trans test that was developed by Edward Lewis (1918-2004) 
for Drosophila, to test whether two mutations occupy the same locus. Among the most important 
implications of these results was that not only the genes on the chromosomes, but also the 
constituents of individual genes were arranged in linear order. His results thus strongly supported 
the Watson-Crick model of DNA, as well as Crick’s later sequence hypothesis, according to which the 
sequence of bases in a strand of DNA or RNA determines the linear basis of the sequence of amino 
acids in proteins. The results also implied, however, that the genetic unit of recombination and the 
unit of function, i.e., physiological activity, are not identical, thus complicating the definition of the 
gene (Holmes, 2006). Benzer made further important contributions to molecular biology that had a 
stronger biochemical aspect, one of them being the elucidation of the role of aminoacyl tRNA 
synthetases in translating the genetic code, and another the demonstration of the degeneracy of the 
genetic code (Greenspan, 2009). 
                                                          
19 For a detailed reconstruction of Benzer’s phage work see Holmes (2006), and for a biographical overview see 
Greenspan (2009). This section is based on these accounts as well as on an interview with Benzer conducted by 
Heidi Aspaturian (Benzer, 1991). 
20 The CSHL phage course was a regular event organized by Delbrück since 1945. For the significance of the 
phage group, see Kay (1993), Ch. 8, and Morange (2000b), Ch. 4. 
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Nonetheless, Benzer developed an interest in questions of neuro-physiology and behavior. In his 
autobiographical account, he named several influences, among them Dean E. Wooldridge’s (1913-
2006) Machinery of the Brain (Wooldridge, 1963), the effect of which on his thinking he likened to 
that of Schrödinger’s book. Wooldridge was not a neuro-scientist but an engineer, and he reasoned 
about the brain in terms of design principles for information processing, drawing on the pervasive 
analogy of brains and computers. Benzer also mentioned the fact that he had observed personality 
differences in his daughters (Benzer, 1991, p. 79). These influences might or might not be seen as 
retrospective, narrative rationalizations of the scientific biography. What was probably more 
important was a broader trend in his community. Other researchers in molecular biology turned to 
higher organisms and became interested in complex physiological processes, hoping that these, since 
they were already partly characterized in biochemical terms, could be related to the findings of 
molecular genetics. Among those who moved from experimental systems grounded in microbiology 
to multicellular organisms were Delbrück, who started working with Phycomyces, Jacob, who 
embarked on research in mice, Gunther Stent (1924-2008), who turned to Drosophila, as well as 
Brenner and Streisinger, who introduced new organisms (C. elegans and Zebrafish, respectively) that 
were to become important model systems in the last quarter of the twentieth century. A recurrent 
theme was the impression that “all the molecular biology problems were on the verge of being 
solved,” at least on the basic level, having to do with the structural and informational basis of the 
replication and synthesis of cellular molecules (Benzer, 1991, p. 79).21 
Benzer first seriously engaged with neuro-biology when he spent a sabbatical at the lab of Roger 
Sperry (1913-1994) at Caltech in 1965. Sperry, who would receive the Nobel Prize for Medicine or 
Physiology in 1981 for his work on split-brain patients, was at the time mainly known for the 
chemoaffinity hypothesis. According to the latter, neurons possess cytochemical markers that define 
their type and allow them to connect selectively with their targets (see Meyer, 1998). This was what 
made Benzer think that making a connection between genes, brains, and behavior could be quite 
straightforward. If the wiring of the brain would be guided by specific molecules and those molecules 
would be synthesized on the basis of genetic information, then it would be immediately clear how 
the brain’s structure and thus the behavior it generates would be programmed into the genome, or 
so Benzer thought. Making this connection was what constituted Benzer’s initial research question: 
The genes contain the information for the circuit diagram, but little is known 
about the relationship between this primary information and its conversion into 
the end result. (Benzer, 1968, p. 50) 
In 1967 Benzer joined the Caltech faculty and established his own lab, built around a genetic 
approach to Drosophila behavior and neuro-physiology. 
3.2. Organizational knowledge, infrastructures and institutions: Caltech and the Drosophila 
community 
Benzer needed to implement his project in a material and social context that would enable the 
envisioned approach. His experience with bacteriophage clearly influenced his choice of the 
Drosophila model system and provided him with knowledge of how to navigate such a system and 
exploit its features to support his goals. Sperry’s lab neither worked with Drosophila nor applied a 
                                                          
21 See also Stent (1968), p. 160, and Brenner (1998 [1963]), p. x, as well as Morange (1997), p. 370, and de 
Chadarevian, (1998, p. 85), Fn 11. 
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genetic approach. In fact, members of the lab were quite skeptical towards genetics as a means to 
investigate neuro-physiology, as Benzer reported (Benzer, 1991, p. 87). Benzer, while being a guest in 
Sperry’s lab, initially had worked on frogs, an experimental animal used by the group next to others. 
Why Benzer eventually chose to work with Drosophila is not entirely clear. His rationalization reads 
like this:  
The fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster represents a compromise. In mass, in 
number of nerve cells, in amount of DNA and in generation time it stands roughly 
halfway on a logarithmic scale between the colon bacillus Escherichia coli (which 
can be regarded as having a one-neuron nervous system) and man. (Benzer, 1973, 
p. 24) 
But similar arguments regarding optimal compromises have been made by other researchers with 
respect to other organisms, for instance by Brenner (1974) and Streisinger (Streisinger et al., 1981) 
regarding C. elegans and Zebrafish, respectively. It is more likely that Benzer chose Drosophila 
because he knew from his work with the E. coli phage system that it was essential not only to have 
protocols for basic steps of the relevant experiments worked out instead of setting up the right 
conditions in a long trial and error procedure, but also to have the mutagens, instruments, and, most 
importantly, a large number of mutant stocks in place, as well as an infrastructure for sharing them 
among researchers. The fact that Drosophila as a system – in the sense of a model organism that is 
embedded in a material and social infrastructure – was well established, in particular at Caltech 
where the direct legacy of the group around Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945) was located and 
materialized in collections and personified mainly through Alfred Sturtevant (1891-1970) and Lewis, 
made the organism a plausible choice: 
The wealth of genetic knowledge of the fruit fly Drosophila, and the availability of 
many mutants and special chromosomal arrangements make it an organism of 
choice for the genetic approach. (Benzer, 1968, p. 50) 
Analyzing the research project of Walter Gehring (1939-2014), Marcel Weber concludes that 
“Drosophila played such an important role in the molecularization of developmental biology not so 
much because of antecedently existing theoretical knowledge on its embryology, but mainly due to 
the enormous experimental resources accumulated by generations of geneticists” (Weber, 2004, p. 
74). Drosophila was thus more than just an element in the experimental system. A community had 
formed around the species that developed stocks of mutants and an infrastructure to distribute 
them, codified and recorded not only anatomical and genetic knowledge about the organism but also 
practical knowledge about how to maintain and manipulate the organism, and set up infrastructures 
to distribute all available information.22 
Benzer did not resituate knowledge (organizational schemata) about how to build such a community 
and an infrastructure that allows the collection and exchange of knowledge and stocks. But that this 
sometimes happens is illustrated by the cases of Brenner and Streisinger, who introduced new 
organisms for research and clearly envisioned such organized communities and means for the 
exchange of information and resources. Both researchers drew on their experience of working with 
the E. coli phage system and being members of the respective community, as well as on their 
                                                          
22 See Kohler (1994) for the history of the Drosophila community, and in particular the community’s exchange 
network (Ch. 5). For the general role of communities and infrastructures in model organism research, see also 
Ankeny and Leonelli (2011). Kay (1993) provides a history of Caltech and its social and material culture. 
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knowledge about the Drosophila community. Benzer himself can probably be best described as 
tapping into an existing social and material structure by adopting the Drosophila system. And yet, he 
still had to draw on his organizational knowledge about model systems and their communities to see 
the advantage, navigate the structures successfully, and turn them into supportive context for his 
project. 
3.3. Goal knowledge and the domain of phenomena: Benzer’s understanding of behavior and its 
explanation 
Much of human personality is determined by heredity. For instance, recent 
studies have revealed that inmates of institutions for the criminally insane show 
an unusually high frequency of chromosomal abnormalities – suggesting that 
undue emphasis might have been placed on environmental factors in causing 
their behavior. (Benzer, 1968, p. 50) 
This is how Benzer began his above cited first published exposition of his new research program. The 
sentence sounds much like a caricature of genetics as an overly positivistic and reductionist science. 
In fact, it not only expresses an explicit genetic determinism with respect to human behavior, but has 
a rather eugenic ring to it, suggesting the possibility of a biological handle on social problems.23 Such 
statements, displaying a simplistic understanding of the relation of genes and behaviors that 
probably neither Benzer nor many other geneticists actually held at the time, were of course 
problematic when taken to inform public opinion and policies in the context of complex social 
problems. More interesting for the present question is how the perception of human behavior 
influenced the construction of the research questions regarding Drosophila genetics. Such 
statements might be seen as rhetorical maneuvers in establishing the relevance of basic research, 
rather than motivations for the research design. Yet the notion of normalcy and deviance implicit in 
the statement fuses with geneticists’ focus on phenotypic difference between the normal “wild type” 
and the deviant mutant in forming the notion of behavior that informed Benzer’s research.24 In fact, 
Benzer often equated behavior with personality, or “temperament” in this context. As mentioned, he 
referred to the personality differences between his daughters as a phenomenon that prompted him 
to become interested in the subject (Benzer, 1991, p. 79). And after describing fly mutations that 
alter the circadian rhythm, i.e., the molecular mechanism regulating the timing of physiological 
processes in relation to the rhythm of day and night, Benzer remarked laconically:  
In a normal world, these mutants would appear always to wake up too early or 
too late. One need not look far to find human analogs of these types. It is possible 
that genetics may be a strong component of this personality trait. (Benzer, 1972, 
p. 7) 
These examples point out that behavioral characters were not conceived of as species specific, but in 
terms of individual differences. Such mutations might also drive speciation – in Darwinian theory 
there is a way from individual variation to species differences – but Benzer’s interest was not in the 
evolution of behavior. He was concerned with causation in the sense of “How does it work?”, 
according to Niko Tinbergen’s (1907-1988) classification of questions regarding behavior, or with 
                                                          
23 Benzer does not provide a reference, but so called XYY males and the potential connection of the condition 
with aggressive behavior was the topic of the day in human genetics (Nielsen et al., 1968; see Denno, 1988). 
24 See Holmes (2017) on the concept of wild type. 
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proximate causes in Ernst Mayr’s (1904-2005) sense (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963). But Benzer’s 
understanding of behavioral characters was decidedly different from the way that behavior was 
understood in ethology, a discipline that was probably at the peak of its popularity at the time.25 
Ethologists were not only mainly interested in ultimate causes, they also conceptualized behavior in 
terms of instinct, and they did not conceive of behavior in terms of individual, but of species 
differences.26 Lorenz wrote: 
A species-specific behavior pattern is not something that animals may or may not 
perform; it is a character that the systematic group concerned simply has, just as 
it has claws, bills, or wings of a particular form! (Lorenz, 1996 [1944 - 1948], p. 
238) 
There was, of course, another highly influential field of research on behavior, namely behaviorism. 
Behaviorists emphasized environmental influence and theorized that behavioral patterns were 
mainly learned. Benzer did not deny the influence of environment, but he thought that behavioral 
tendencies are “to a large degree” inherited. 
It should not be surprising if, to a large degree, the genes also determine 
behavioral temperament, although, of course, environmental influences can also 
play a large role. All behavior is inevitably the resultant of both components. To 
discern the genetic contribution clearly, the thing to do is to keep the 
environment constant and change the genes. (Benzer, 1972, p. 4) 
Behavior has been a theme in the study of heredity since its beginning. From Francis Galton (1822-
1911) to Charles Davenport (1866-1944), tracing behavioral deviation in families was common and 
the close link to eugenic motivations is obvious. Behavior in Drosophila has been studied since the 
early twentieth century (Carpenter, 1905) and mutants showing behavioral peculiarities have been 
described frequently in Drosophila genetics (e.g., McEwen, 1918). In classical genetics of the Morgan 
school the emphasis was, however, less on the explanation of characters than on the use of 
characters to identify genes and their mode of inheritance, which was explained through 
chromosomal mechanics. Later explorations of developmental genetics aimed at an explanation of 
the phenotype, but focused on anatomical structures. The study of the genetics of behavior in 
Drosophila became a serious research subject only in the late 1950s. Jerry Hirsch (1922-2008) is 
credited with pioneering quantitative studies, focusing on phototaxis and geotaxis (Hirsch and 
Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1961). Hirsch’s research was also concerned with individual differences, as 
opposed to the ethologists’ species-specific behaviors, and he rejected the behaviorist emphasis on 
learning. Unlike Benzer, however, Hirsch was not interested in the effect of single genes. His work 
was rooted in quantitative population genetics and he focused on heritability in selection 
experiments. Benzer saw his work as complementing the work done by Hirsch. Hirsch, instead, was 
highly critical of Benzer’s work and saw the single gene approach as misguided in studying behavior. 
As a result, the relation between the two approaches became seen as a major tension in behavioral 
                                                          
25 For instance, Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989), Tinbergen, and Karl von Frisch (1886-1982) will receive the Nobel 
Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1973. 
26 See Burkhardt (2005) on the program of ethology. 
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genetics (see Tully, 1996).27 What Benzer imported from Hirsch’s research project was the more 
specific phenomena that were studied in an exemplary manner to find general principles that apply 
to the relation of genes, the nervous system, and behavior. These might be called model 
phenomena, in this case geotaxis and phototaxis. Hirsch had studied both, while Benzer focused on 
the latter in his first experiments. These phenomena had been observed and studied before. In fact, 
Benzer cites both early studies on the genetics of Drosophila behavior mentioned above, which are 
concerned with the reaction of flies to light and gravity, as well as a text book on animal orientation 
(Fraenkel and Gunn, 1961).28 Nonetheless, the clue that Benzer got from Hirsch’s approach was that 
these behavioral phenotypes could be conveniently operationalized by putting flies in tubes and 
orienting the tubes in various ways towards the source of stimulation (although Benzer’s design of 
the screening device differed from that of Hirsch, reflecting the different interest in qualitative as 
opposed to quantitative evaluations of the phenotype). 
Coming back to the comparison of Benzer’s understanding of behavior with that of ethology, an 
additional point can be made. Not only did Benzer focus on individual variation and its genetic basis 
in single mutations, he also held a view of behavior that equated the organism with a machine that 
performs certain movements unless some parts are broken such that the movements are inhibited. 
This becomes obvious in the way he describes the different types of phototactic mutants he 
identified. If the notion of behavior is based on the idea of instinct as in ethology, a negatively 
phototactic mutant running away from the light would be perceived as having an altered instinct. 
Regarding a mutant that runs neither towards nor away from the light, but simply moves randomly in 
both directions because the fly is blind and does not see the light, the instinct perspective would 
suggest that the instinct is probably unaltered, and that it is only a physiological function that is 
impaired, which prevents the otherwise unaltered behavioral tendency from being actualized. For 
Benzer (e.g., 1973, p. 29), instead, these cases were on a par. In both cases, some element in the 
machinery of the molecular and neural mechanisms is defective and therefore the organism qua 
machine cannot generate the patterns of movements in the standard way. Here the influence of 
Wooldridge’s Machinery of the Brain, which was written from an engineer’s perspective, might have 
been relevant. This mechanistic view also informs the kind of explanations aimed for and the overall 
strategies employed to achieve these goals.29 Benzer wrote: “Once assembled, the functioning 
nervous system embodies a complex of interacting electrical and biochemical events to generate 
behavior” (Benzer, 1968, p. 50). This fits well with the way that philosophers of science have 
characterized mechanistic explanations in terms of entities and activities interacting in a spatial and 
temporal organization that is productive of the phenomena that constitute the explanandum.30 As 
these authors have also pointed out, this understanding of explanations is closely tied to strategies of 
                                                          
27 The notions of complementation and tension implied that the researchers considered their projects to be 
concerned with the same domain (see Fn 3, above). 
28 These works are influenced by Jacques Loeb’s (1859-1924) studies on tropism (Loeb, 1905; see Pauly, 1987). 
29 The reductionism and determinism involved in the genetic approach to behavior has been criticized from 
within science, as well as by philosophers. Next to Hirsch, Stent (1981) demanded caution in the interpretation 
of the results derived from the single gene approach. Kenneth Schaffner (1998) discusses the implications of a 
reductionist approach in the case of Brenner’s program. I am concerned here only with the question of how the 
ideas of the genetic approach and mechanistic explanation shaped the design of the research project. 
30 On mechanistic explanations and the associated experimental strategies and notational practices, see 
Bechtel and Richardson (2010) and Craver and Darden (2013). 
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discovering mechanism thus conceived. In terms of project knowledge, goal schemata (in this case 
the very generic schema of a mechanistic explanation) and methodological schemata (in this case an 
intervention schema based on introducing defects) are transferred into the project as closely 
associated bundles. They will be considered in more detail in the following section. 
3.4. Goal knowledge and methodological knowledge bundles: Pathways and the genetic 
approach 
The fine structure and interlacing of even the simplest nervous systems are such 
that to dissect them requires a very fine scalpel indeed. Gene mutation can 
provide such a microsurgical tool; with it one might hope to analyze the system in 
a manner analogous to the one which has proven so successful in unravelling 
biochemical pathways and control mechanisms at the molecular level. (Benzer, 
1968, p. 50) 
This is how Benzer continued the first description of his research program. It can be observed that 
the explanatory goals are limited to neither the neural nor to the molecular realm. Benzer employed 
several notions to characterize the explanatory goal of the project, i.e., the mechanisms to be 
elucidated, which are relevant for behavior on the physiological level, that is on the level of cell 
interactions facilitated by molecular interactions. For instance, he spoke of the “circuit components 
of behavior, from sensory receptors to central nervous system to effector muscles,” which “are 
constructed under direction of the genes” (Hotta and Benzer, 1972, p. 527). Again, the influence of 
Wooldridge is obvious: the nervous system is likened to a computer. A more pervasive notion, 
however, is that of a pathway. While in the quote opening this section the pathway is associated with 
metabolism, Benzer also spoke of the “visual pathway” (Benzer, 1973, p. 28), a common term at the 
time, of the “behavioral pathway” (Benzer, 1974, p. 11), and the “whole pathway between the light 
and the response” (Benzer, 1991, p. 86) or the “pathway from input to output” (Hotta and Benzer, 
1970, p. 1156). In both cases, the biochemical and the neuro-physiological, the pathway metaphor 
suggests a series of events (chemical reactions, transmissions of signals in the nervous system) that 
are explanatory of the end result (e.g., a functional molecule, a motor response). Both concepts, the 
neural pathway and the biochemical pathway, go back at least to the 1920s (Thagard, 2003). 
According to Paul Thagard, biochemical pathways can be understood as figuring in “explanation 
schemas,” which characterize mechanistic explanations (Ibid., pp. 235 and 237). The notion of 
pathway not only expresses linearity as a simplifying assumption about the mechanisms in question, 
but when applied on the biochemical and the physiological level constructs a connection between 
the mechanisms. In the simplest case, the synthesis of functional molecules from genes builds crucial 
parts of the physiological mechanisms, i.e., the path consisting of “receptor response, central 
nervous system integration, and motor output” (Hotta and Benzer, 1970, p. 1156). The vertical 
biochemical pathways explain the elements in the horizontal physiological pathways (mainly by 
explaining the properties and capacities of neurons and other cells), while the horizontal 
physiological pathways from sensory input to motor output explain the behavioral response. The 
goal is thus an inter-level integration of mechanisms (Craver and Darden, 2013, Ch. 10). 
The explanatory schema suggested a methodology. Benzer spoke of “dissection” of the nervous 
system. He had used the term “dissection” already regarding his investigation of the fine structure of 
genes. The work of George Beadle (1903-1989) and Edward Tatum (1909-1975) on Neurospora 
crassa (Beadle and Tatum, 1941, see also Kohler, 1994, Ch. 7) provided an exemplar for the genetic 
dissection of biochemical pathways by genetic means (although they did not use the term 
“dissection”). The basic idea was to mutagenize many individual organisms and select mutations that 
interrupt the same metabolic pathway to identify the elements and determine the temporal order of 
steps in the reaction. On a more generic level, the strategy has been described as the genetic 
approach: it aims to “discover naturally occurring or artificially produced mutants that exhibited a 
19 
difference relevant to some biological process of interest and then carrying out genetic analyses of 
the mutants” (Waters, 2004, p. 799). Benzer made use of this strategy in many ways, which always 
involved some form of adjustment to the specific task. In a manner analog to the dissection of 
biochemical pathways, it was possible to dissect a physiological pathway by collecting many 
mutations that affect the same physiological process, presumably because they interrupt one of the 
molecular pathways necessary for the cells in the physiological pathways to fulfill their functions.31 
The horizontal pathway is thus not only constructed under the “direction of the genes,” but it can 
also be dissected by disabling the vertical pathway through mutagenesis. The notion of dissection 
suggests that a first intermediary goal in the analysis is to determine what elements there are in the 
pathway, i.e., decomposition.  
Another central notion is that of a map, pointing to the aspect of localization. Benzer and Yoshiki 
Hotta (b. 1938), a postdoc in his lab, used fate maps representing the parts of the early embryo in 
terms of the structures they will give rise to in the larva and in the adult organism, to determine the 
site in the adult fly at which a gene involved in the generation of behavior is active and thereby, of 
course, also which anatomical parts are involved in the first place. They called this site “focus” and 
this became the central epistemic object in the early phase of Benzer’s new program (Hotta and 
Benzer, 1972). Foci were epistemic objects in so far as they are embedded and contained in an 
experimental system and “embody what one does not yet know” (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 28). What is 
the identity of the gene active at the site, what is its product, what is the function of the product, 
how does it interact with other molecules, how does this interaction determine the function of the 
cells, and how does the cell function integrate in the larger physiological process generating 
behavior? These were the questions that could be asked based on mapping the focus. To achieve the 
goal of localization, Benzer and his co-workers adopted a specific method based on genetic 
mosaicism, i.e., of generating organisms that contain tissues with different genotypes. As Hotta and 
Benzer summarized the project in an article titled “Mapping of Behaviour in Drosophila Mosaics”: “By 
making genetic mosaics and constructing embryonic ‘fate maps’ it is possible to locate the 
anatomical site of abnormalities affecting behaviour” (Hotta and Benzer, 1972, p. 527). The notion of 
mapping thus expressed another intermediary goal in the search for mechanisms, the method to 
achieve this goal, as well as the form representation of the result. The methodological combination 
of mutations and mosaics employed to achieve the intermediate goals can thus be characterized as 
decomposition and localization (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010). Mechanistic explanations can be 
seen as constituting already quite complex goal schemata that can be broken down into several 
intermediary goals, each associated with an appropriate methodological schema, which are then 
combined into complex methodological schemata accordingly. While mechanistic explanations and 
associated intervention strategies are generic goals and methods, molecular and neural pathways 
and mutagenesis are domain-specific renderings of these goal and method bundles. Nonetheless, 
they constitute a fairly abstract approach applicable to many problems. The mapping approach based 
on mosaics is an example of a method on the level of a specific technique. In the following section I 
shall explain the approach in more detail, reconstruct how the relevant knowledge was resituated, 
and show how methodological and notational schemata are closely associated in this case. 
                                                          
31 Already Benzer’s (1955) dissection of the gene relied on the strategy of collecting as many mutants as 
possible that, in this case, affect the same gene. The method of genetic dissection was thus scalable from genes 
to biosynthetic pathways, to physiological processes. 
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3.5. Intermediary goals, methodological and representational knowledge: Mapping the “focus” 
of gene action 
On the assumption that non-phototactic mutants are blind, the question could be asked which point 
in the pathway of reception, transmission, and processing of the visual signal is affected. One of the 
procedures applied was an elctroretinogram (ERG) recording. Based on this technique, Hotta and 
Benzer were able to identify various non-phototactic mutants which seemed to show an effect in the 
photoreceptor cells and others which seemed to have deficient second-order neurons (Hotta and 
Benzer, 1969). There were, however, other behavioral mutants for which it was not easy to detect 
the anatomical structures that were affected because the relevant structures might be hidden 
deeper inside the body of the fly, showing no histological aberrations (or one wasn’t sure where to 
look for them). A further complication was that not all effects were cell autonomous, i.e., tissues that 
were genotypically wild type could still show aberrations as secondary effects of a gene defect 
elsewhere in the body that prevented the production of a circulating substance, for instance, that 
was necessary for the former structure to develop or function normally. Here is how Benzer defined 
the task: 
[I]f one knows that a certain behavior (nonphototactic, say) is produced by a 
single-gene mutation and that it seems to be explained by an anatomical fault 
(the degenerated receptors), one still cannot say with certainty what is the 
primary "focus" of that genetic alteration, that is, the site in the body at which the 
mutant gene exerts its primary effect. (Benzer, 1973, p. 28) 
To solve the problem, Hotta and Benzer adopted and expanded a methodology that was introduced 
by Sturtevant more than 30 years before. Sturtevant (1920) had used flies (Drosophila simulans) that 
were genetically mosaic, i.e., which consisted of tissue areas that were genotypically different, to 
demonstrate non-autonomy of the vermilion character. By drawing a methodological analogy from 
his earlier work where he mapped the relative distance of genes on the chromosomes on the basis of 
the frequency of recombination (Sturtevant, 1913; see also Vorms, 2013), Sturtevant went on to 
devise a technique that allowed him to infer the relative distances between regions in the early 
embryo that would give rise to certain parts of the fly (Sturtevant, 1929). Antonio García-Bellido (b. 
1936) and John R. Merriam, who were working as postdocs in Lewis lab at Caltech, re-worked 
Sturtevant’s partly unpublished data to create more advanced fate maps (García-Bellido and 
Merriam, 1969). In the zygote of the fly many nuclear divisions occur before the nuclei migrate to the 
boundary of the egg where membranes are formed, resulting in a spherical single cell layer – the 
blastoderm. It happens occasionally (and more frequently in certain mutants) that an X chromosome 
is lost in nuclear division, resulting in nuclei with different genotypes. Since the position of the axis of 
the first nuclear division relative to the axis of the egg is random and determines the distribution of 
the nuclei with different genotypes in the blastoderm, the lines dividing areas in the blastoderm with 
different genotypes are hence randomly distributed. Two areas that lie closer together in the 
blastoderm are less likely to be of a different genotype. Accordingly, one can use the frequency of 
any two structures of the adult fly showing the same or a different phenotype to calculate the 
relative distance in the blastoderm of the cells that give rise to the respective adult structures. The 
blastoderm is for that purpose conceptualized as the two-dimensional surface of a sphere. If the 
relative distances of blastoderm loci can be related to known positions or dimensions in the 
blastoderm, such as the dorsal and ventral midline, the result would be a fate map of the 
blastoderm, i.e., a map indicating the physical positions of areas in the blastoderm that give rise to 
different structures (thus having different fates). These maps could then be related to other fate 
maps that were constructed by embryological techniques, such as marking cells with vital dyes and 
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tracking the movement in the developing embryo or observing where in the larval or adult organism 
traces of the dye could be found.32 
To create a fate map based on mosaic analysis, it was necessary to determine the genotype of the 
anatomical structures in the adult fly. This was straightforward in the case of surface structures that 
reveal their genotype through marker phenotypes such as cuticle color, bristle shape, or eye color. It 
was less clear how the methodology could be applied to determine the relative position of 
blastoderm regions that give rise to internal structures. Benzer and Hotta, working in close vicinity to 
García-Bellido and Merriam, adopted the mosaic methodology, expanded its scope, and applied it to 
behavioral phenotypes (Hotta and Benzer, 1970 and 1972). They constructed a fate map for 
Drosophila melanogaster based on surface phenotypes. These figured as “landmarks,” as they called 
them, in mapping internal structures that influenced behavior by recording the frequency by which a 
behavioral mutant phenotype co-occurs with a surface phenotype. This was the basis for calculating 
the relative distance between the regions in the blastoderm that gave rise to the surface landmarks 
and those giving rise to the anatomical structures that caused the behavioral abnormality when 
dysfunctional due to carrying the mutant genotype. Through triangulating distances between 
landmarks and behavior related blastoderm regions, it was possible to locate the latter on the fate 
map. Since the fate map based on the mosaic methodology could be related to embryological fate 
maps based on lineage tracing, it was often possible to conclude, from the location of the region 
associated with the behavioral phenotype in the blastoderm and the knowledge of its fate, where in 
the adult body the gene was active that in its mutant form resulted in the aberrant behavior. Hence 
the pathway of inference ran from the behavior to the blastoderm and back to the anatomical 
structures involved in generating behavior.One mutant analyzed by Hotta and Benzer, to give an 
example, was called drop-dead.33 The flies carrying the mutation would behave normally for one or 
two days, but after some time (varying among affected individuals) they would move less and more 
erratically and finally fall on their back and die. As Hotta and Benzer observed, “[a] priori, symptoms 
such as these could result from malfunction in almost any part of the body of the fly, such as 
blockage of the gut, a general biochemical disturbance, or a nervous disorder” (Hotta and Benzer, 
1972, p. 531). By mapping the blastoderm region associated with the phenotype, they could infer, 
based on existing fate maps, that it lies in a region that was found to give rise to the brain by 
embryologists (see Fig. 1, left side). Histological analysis confirmed the localization in that, after the 
onset of the drop-dead behavior, affected individuals showed signs of degeneration in the brain. 
However, without the mosaic analysis it would not have been possible to determine whether this 
was a primary effect of the disturbed gene function in the brain cells (i.e., if the effect was 
autonomous), or a secondary effect of the mutation causing deficiencies at another site in the body. 
                                                          
32 See Galperin (1998) and Griesemer (2007) for the history and epistemology of lineage tracing and fate 
mapping. 
33 Phototaxis was the first phenotype for which Benzer collected mutants. As the project progressed, more and 
more behavioral phenotypes appeared. The mutant drop-dead is also an example of a phenotype that would 
not have been classified as behavioral in other areas of behavioral biology. 
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Fig. 1. The representational techniques of fate mapping: Fig. 6 (left) and 10 (right) from Hotta and Benzer 
(1972, pp. 529 and 533) with original captions. The left diagram shows how the parts of the adult fly were 
mapped on regions in the blastoderm that will give rise to these structures. This made it possible to map a 
behavioral phenotype on the blastoderm and infer in which part of the adult body the gene that produces the 
phenotype when mutated is active. The right diagram shows a fate map locating the blastoderm focus for the 
drop-dead mutant in a region that (according to the left diagram) should give rise to the brain. Reprinted by 
permission from Springer Nature: Hotta, Y., and Benzer, S. (1972). Mapping of Behaviour in Drosophila 
Mosaics. Nature, 240(5383), 527–535. Copyright 1972. 
 
The generic strategy of using the genetic approach for mapping, i.e., for not only identifying but also 
localizing entities relative to each other and in a larger structure of which they are part, was familiar 
to Benzer from his earlier work on the fine structure of a phage gene. This enabled him to evaluate 
the potential of the specific method of mosaic analysis developed by his colleagues at Caltech. He 
acquired knowledge about the technique through direct communication and the relevant 
publications. Using project knowledge on this specific level amounts to reproducing an experiment, 
albeit in a differential manner that embeds it in the context of different goals and combines it with 
different techniques (in this case, behavioral screens and ERGs, etc.).34 Knowledge of the mosaic 
method came with knowledge of procedures for analyzing the data and of notational practices for 
recording the data and representing the result. The construction of the resulting maps was informed 
by two domain-specific mapping schemata: one derived from genetics and hence familiar to Benzer, 
representing the relative distances between entities (in the case of genes these maps were one-
dimensional, here they became two dimensional), and one from embryology, representing the 
blastula as a two-dimensional space consisting of regions with differential developmental fate 
(Galperin, 1998). The introduction of the mapping strategy also demonstrates the dynamic character 
of research projects and hence of the recruitment of relevant project knowledge. The (intermediary) 
goals of the project became adjusted in response to the constraints and opportunities that emerged 
in the course of its implementation. The idea of hitting upon cytochemical markers that determine 
the wiring pattern of the nervous system through mutation that motivated the project initially was 
not entertained anymore once the project gained traction. Instead, the mapping strategy was taken 
up in an opportunistic manner. The spatial proximity of researchers enabled by the institution played 
                                                          
34 On differential reproduction, see Rheinberger (1997), Ch. 5. 
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an important role here.35 The approach allowed Benzer and Hotta to achieve the intermediary goal of 
localizing the site of action of genes that affect behavior, or what they called its “focus.” This was 
seen as a step towards elucidating the biochemical pathways the gene and its product are involved 
in, and how they interact with other genes and their products to build the neuro-physiological 
mechanisms that generate behavior.  
4. Conclusion: Modes of resituating project knowledge in the attempt to create a molecular 
biology of multicellular organisms 
Mary Morgan’s (2014) account of resituating knowledge distinguishes between instances in which 
knowledge is transferred from one local setting to another, similar setting, and instances where a 
form of abstraction takes place that de-contextualizes a local finding, creating some causal or 
conceptual knowledge that can then be resituated in many, as well as less comparable, localities. This 
matches with the notion, supported by the case study, that project knowledge can be domain-
specific or generic (see 1.4). Some project knowledge is rather abstract, specifying on the one hand 
forms of knowledge in the broadest sense in terms of possible relations between entities that can be 
the subject of scientific knowledge, and on the other hand generic strategies for achieving knowledge 
of that form. Knowing the generic structure of a mechanistic explanation and the basic experimental 
strategies that can be employed to investigate mechanisms would be an example of highly abstract 
project knowledge. The case study suggests that researchers often reason about the design of 
research projects on the basis of more domain-specific project knowledge, specifying on the one 
hand possible outcomes of research in terms of the entities or processes that make up the domain, 
and on the other hand specific operations of intervening or registering that pertain to these entities 
or processes, as well as specific forms of representing hypotheses or results and of organizing the 
work. A more specific mechanism schema, for instance, will encode what is considered an adequate 
mechanistic explanation in a community investigating a domain. Benzer began his reasoning (at least 
to the extent that it is documented in his published writings) with the notion of biochemical 
pathways and their investigation by means of genetic analysis, which was familiar to him from his 
earlier work in the emerging field of molecular genetics. Nonetheless, when he thought of 
mechanisms on multiple levels, including neural mechanisms, he presumably relied on a more 
generic understanding of mechanisms. Instead, when it comes to selecting appropriate 
methodological strategies for investigating higher level mechanisms, the strategy was not to derive 
an abstract notion of introducing a defect in the system from the specific strategy of mutagenesis, 
but rather to use this specific strategy to intervene on the higher level mechanism.36 While the 
notions of biochemical pathways and genetic analysis, albeit domain-specific, are still fairly abstract, 
knowledge about detailed experimental designs is often resituated directly from one local setting to 
another. Benzer’s adoption of the mosaic-based mapping strategy and the representational 
techniques associated with it are a case in point. Here experiments, calculations, and drawings 
performed by Sturtevant, García-Bellido, and Merriam were reproduced. The purpose was not, 
however, to replicate an experiment to show that it is valid, but rather to produce the same kind of 
information regarding the physiological processes and genes of interest to Benzer and his group. In 
the course of the application of the procedure, the experimental design was adapted to their 
                                                          
35 On local contingencies, see Knorr-Cetina (1981), Ch. 2. 
36 Intervening on the level of parts of the nervous system would have been an alternative. The group of Sperry, 
for instance, followed the same broad method, but their approach was more rooted in classical ablation 
experiments of physiology. 
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purposes and expanded in its scope. This form of resituation of project knowledge is thus well 
captured by Rheinberger’s notion of differential reproduction of experimental systems (Rheinberger, 
1997, Ch. 5). 
Regarding the more abstract forms of project knowledge discussed above, one question is whether 
such knowledge circulates in research communities and researchers acquire it in its abstract form, or 
whether they learn by working on instances of research problems and through these gain an abstract 
understanding. Presumably, both ways of project knowledge acquisition play a role. Textbooks and 
teaching provide generic notions of research problems and suitable experimental designs. In this 
case the step of de-situation by abstraction has already been made by others and researchers only 
resituate the knowledge when designing a new project. But researchers also learn from experience in 
earlier work on specific problems and perform both steps in this kind of resituation via abstraction. 
Another route might be provided by exemplars. Morgan further distinguishes instances of resituation 
where local knowledge is established or at least perceived as typical or exemplary. Some ways of 
carrying out research projects can certainly be described as functioning as exemplars. If the project 
knowledge that these exemplars embody is carried over to another situation, this requires the same 
work as in cases of local-local transfer or cases that involve abstraction, depending on how similar 
the target situation is to the exemplary situation. For this reason, the distinction with the other 
modes of resituating knowledge cannot be drawn sharply, at least for project knowledge. The notion 
of exemplars is nonetheless justified for experiments, representations, or research enabling 
structures that are well known in a community. There might often be more recent or more elaborate 
approaches, but when researchers are not aware of them (or they simply don’t come to mind), they 
resort to well-known exemplars. These serve as a source for relevant project knowledge especially 
when researchers are not yet looking for more specific procedures, i.e., when they have to choose a 
research environment and frame a problem in the first place. Once a project is initiated on the basis 
of exemplars, more specific project knowledge will be sought. The Drosophila and phage 
communities and their networks of exchange certainly often served as exemplars when new model 
organisms have been introduced or refashioned (as was the case for Brenner and Streisinger). 
Particular experimental approaches also frequently figure in that way. Sturtevant’s analysis of the 
non-autonomous expression of the vermilion character or Beadle’s and Tatum’s experiments with 
neurospora crassa, despite being somewhat dated at the time, clearly were exemplars that came to 
Benzer’s mind when reasoning in terms of genetic analysis. These latter cases of exemplary problems 
and solutions are reminiscent of Kuhn’s notion of exemplars as one of the central meanings of the 
term “paradigm” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 187). It needs to be emphasized, though, that the present account 
differs from Kuhn’s. Kuhn draws an image of, on the one hand, largely hermetic communities of 
“normal science” that share an understanding of puzzle solving and, on the other hand, of scientific 
change in terms of replacement of one such community by another, sharing a different 
understanding, based on novel exemplars. The emphasis in the present account is on a constantly 
merging and diverging flow of project knowledge that helps to construct familiar problems and 
solutions in novel domains, or recombine methods to forge new approaches. Scientific change, at 
least in twentieth-century biology, seems to be better described as a constant merging and diverging 
of approaches and domains, much more in line with Rheinberger’s notions of conjuctures, hybrids, 
bifurcations, and the formation of experimental cultures (Rheinberger 1997, Ch. 9). The account of 
project knowledge provided here helps to reconstruct the reasoning that underlies these processes. 
Regarding the history of biology, the result of the present study seems to confirm the notion that 
early hopes for making the new molecular biology fruitful for questions of metazoan physiology, in 
particular concerning development and the neural basis of complex behaviors, were not easily 
fulfilled (Morange, 1997; Suárez-Díaz and García-Deister, 2015). Indeed, the results produced by 
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Benzer and his colleagues mainly relied on genetic analysis and were not very molecular in nature. 
One might say that developmental and neuro-genetics only became molecular after new techniques, 
in particular those derived from recombinant DNA techniques, were established towards the end of 
the 1970s (Morange, 1997; Weber, 2004). Important were, for instance, positional cloning to identify 
genes, or in situ hybridization to observe gene expression, and monoclonal antibodies to identify 
proteins, but also many other new ways to analyze regulatory components of the genome, the 
structure and function of gene products, and their regulation and cell function related interactions. 
Benzer’s own work subsequently narrowed down to the development and neuro-physiology of the 
visual system, with questions of behavior moving to the background. This work would take full 
advantage of the new molecular techniques (see, e.g., Fujita et al., 1982). Nonetheless, the focus on 
the role of the resituation of project knowledge in designing new research projects makes clear how 
reasoning about new experimental approaches was often informed by the successes in the bacterial 
or fungal models of early molecular biology and biochemical genetics. Furthermore, it brings to the 
fore how biologists at the time around 1970 pushed classic genetic tools to ever more fine-grained 
analysis, creating, among other things, new ways to trace cell lineage. Clonal analysis was a major 
approach in developmental biology and while strategies based on genetic mosaics developed by 
García-Bellido, Benzer, and others were but one approach, they proved to be highly effective and in 
many ways provided the conditions for relating molecular data to regulatory and cellular functions in 
development and neuro-physiology (Galperin, 1998). 
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